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Abstract—Substantial changes in the generation portfolio take 
place due to the fast growth of renewable energy generation, of 
which the major types such as wind and solar power have 
significant forecast uncertainty. Reducing the impacts of 
uncertainty requires the cooperation of system participants, 
which are supported by proper market rules and incentives. In 
this paper, we propose a bilateral reserve market for variable 
generation (VG) producers and capacity resource providers. In 
this market, VG producers purchase bilateral reserve services 
(BRSs) to reduce potential imbalance penalties, and BRS 
providers earn profits on their available capacity for re -dispatch. 
We show in this paper that by introducing this product, the VG 
producers’ overall imbalance costs are linked to both their 
forecast quality and the available system capacity, which follows 
the cost-causation principle . Case studies demonstrate how the 
proposed BRS mechanism works and its effectiveness. 
Index Terms—bilateral reserve, variable generation, 
uncertainty, electricity market. 
NOMENCLATURE 
A. Indices, parameters, sets and functions 
𝑝𝑣 Actual output of a VG producer. 
𝑃𝑣,𝑚𝑎𝑥 Installed capacity of a VG producer. 
𝛼+, 𝛼− Penalty factors for over- and under-generation. 
𝜆𝐷  Day-ahead energy price. 
𝜆𝑅 Real-time energy price. 
𝜋+, 𝜋− Prices of upward and downward BRS. 
𝑓(∙) Probability density function of VG output. 
𝐹(∙) Cumulative probability density function of VG output. 
B. Variables 
?̂?𝑣 Day-ahead schedule of a VG producer. 
∆𝑟 Executed amount of BRS. 
𝑟+, 𝑟− Contract amount of downward and upward BRS. 
𝑅 Revenue of a VG producer without BRS. 
𝑅∗ Revenue of a VG producer with BRS. 
𝑅𝑔 Revenue of a dispatchable unit without BRS. 
𝑅𝑔∗ Revenue of a dispatchable unit with BRS. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ue to economic and environmental concerns, the world is 
now experiencing a trend of deepening renewable energy 
penetration. Most common types of renewable energy, such as 
wind and solar power, are also named as variable generation 
(VG) because of their nature of variability and uncertainty. 
Proportionally, in some countries such as Denmark and Spain 
the share of wind and solar power in electricity production has 
reached over 30% [1], and the rate is still increasing rapidly. 
These significant changes pose many challenges to power 
system and market operation.  
From the system perspective, sufficient amount of flexibility 
should be ensured to maintain operational reliability. Currently, 
there is consensus that the rising share of VG has increased the 
requirements of operating reserves [2]. Moreover, considering 
the nature of forecasting errors, it is found more economically 
efficient to allocate reserve needs dynamically, i.e. quantifying 
reserve needs for different time instants according to varying 
levels of uncertainty [3]-[5]. 
However, operating reserves are mainly kept for short-term 
variability and uncertainty. Capacities reserved for re-dispatch, 
which address the deviations between day-ahead (DA) and 
real-time (RT) forecasts, are not accurately defined and 
compensated by the current market rules. Considering that the 
increasing integration of VG will cause more deviations 
between DA schedule and RT dispatch, insufficient re-dispatch 
capacity might lead to more severe fluctuating RT prices, 
which is undesirable for market operation. Instead of incenting 
the provision of re-dispatch capacity only through varying RT 
prices, a promising way is to regard them as a reserve service, 
and compensate them independently from the energy market. 
Regardless of the specific market rules, VG will bring 
additional operation costs to the system. Traditionally, these 
integration costs are allocated to consumers based upon energy 
consumption volumes. This seems to violate the rule of cost 
causation because the VG producers bear little responsibility 
for the additional costs they incur on the system. Actually, 
some markets, especially those with large share of VGs, have 
begun to put more responsibility to the VG producers. In Nord 
Pool countries, Spain, UK and Netherland, VG producers are 
now exposed to imbalance costs if they deviate from DA 
schedules [6]. In MISO, VG producers (DIRs) are also subject 
to additional charges for deviating from DA settlements [7]. 
However, an accurate allocation of integration cost is still 
difficult because a widely acceptable method to calculate the 
cost is hardly available [8]. Therefore, a market that addresses 
both the value of re-dispatch capacity and the responsibility of 
managing uncertainty might be a potential alternative. In the 
scheme proposed in this paper, the compensation of available 
capacity and allocation of costs are done in the market process 
without centralized decisions. 
The basic idea of the market is that the provision of 
re-dispatch capacity is defined as a bilateral reserve service 
(BRS), and that the VG producers can purchase BRS to 
partially avoid potential deviation penalties. BRS is very 
similar to traditional reserve products, but has a longer time 
horizon and is carried out in a bilateral way. Actually, bilateral 
capacity contract is not an entirely new concept. In PJM, load 
serving entities (LSE) can fulfill their capacity requirements by 
purchasing it from other dispatchable resources [9]. However, 
this cannot be directly applied to VG producers because this is 
mainly for long-term capacity adequacy, and more importantly, 
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the capacity obligation of a LSE is clearly defined while that of 
a VG producer is not. BRS for VG producers has already been 
discussed by [10] and [11], but the authors mainly focused on 
the pricing issues and did not explain the market design of such 
products. Further analysis is still needed to understand the 
potential benefits of this mechanism in current markets.1 
In this paper, we will discuss the market implementation for 
BRS, and analyze the demand characteristics of this service. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 
II, we describe the concepts of BRS and the market 
implementation; in Section III and IV, we analyze the demand 
characteristics; in Section V, the impacts of network constraints 
are briefly discussed. Case studies are presented in Section VI, 
followed by conclusions in Section VII. 
II. BILATERAL RESERVE SERVICES FOR VG PRODUCERS 
 
Fig. 1. Simplified structure of power system and market with BRS transactions . 
Fig. 1 presents a simplified structure of power system and 
market. In terms of bilateral transactions, VG producers are on 
the demand side and dispatchable resources serve as providers 
of BRS. To establish the responsibility of managing uncertainty, 
VG producers are subject to imbalance penalties if they deviate 
from DA schedules. These penalties can be partially avoided by 
purchasing BRS.  
Fig. 2 demonstrates how a BRS contract works. To own the 
BRS, the producer has to pay premiums equal to the sum of 
payments for upwards and downward BRS, i.e. 𝜋+𝑟+ + 𝜋−𝑟−. 
Approaching RT, when the VG producer has higher certainty 
about its realized output level, it can choose to execute the BRS 
within purchased capacity to avoid at least a part of its 
imbalance costs. For example, in Scenario 1, the 
over-generation is within the purchased amount of downward 
BRS. The VG producer will therefore execute a part of its 
downward BRS to modify its DA schedule to eliminate or 
reduce the day-ahead and real-time deviation. Correspondingly, 
the BRS provider’s DA schedule will be modified in the 
opposite direction at the same amount. For example, if the DA 
schedule of the VG producer is 100 MW and that of the BRS 
provider is 200 MW, and a 20 MW downward BRS is executed. 
Then, the DA schedule of the VG producer and BRS provider 
will be modified to 120 MW and 180 MW respectively, leaving 
the total amount, i.e. 300 MW, unchanged. Similarly, Scenario 
2 describes the execution of upward BRS. In Scenario 3 & 4, 
the deviations exceed the BRS capacity. Then, the VG producer 
will choose to execute all BRS but only a portion of the 
 
1 In this paper we focus on BRS for VG, but other market part icipants (e.g. 
loads) could also benefit from purchasing the same product. 
deviations can be covered. 
 
Fig. 2. The purchasing and execution of BRS for a VG producer. 
 
Fig. 3. BRS transaction and execution along with DA and RT market (the 
processes in Day 1 are repeated for each time instant). 
The transaction and execution of BRS can be embedded into 
the DA and RT market structure. As presented in Fig. 3, the 
BRS transactions are open for a certain period of time after the 
DA energy and reserve market is cleared. The amount of BRS 
sold by a unit is constrained by its physical capacity, as well as 
scheduled energy and reserves. After the transaction period is 
closed, all the signed BRS contracts are sent to the ISO for 
validation. Then, before the closing of each RT market, the VG 
producers have to claim their execution decision, and the 
unused BRS will be released. Finally, the settlement of VG 
producers and BRS providers will be based on both DA and RT 
market settlements, as well as all the executed BRS contracts. 
Executing a BRS contract is intrinsically switching the DA 
positions of producers, and may change the DA power flow. If 
the buyer and seller of BRS are located in the same node, the 
other players in the system will be unaffected. However, when 
they are at different nodes, the network constraints need to be 
carefully examined. In this paper, we ignore the network 
constraints, but include a brief discussion in Section IV 
addressing this issue. 
BRS provides the connection between the sources of 
uncertainty and the providers of re-dispatch capacity. It 
encourages dispatchable resources to provide capacity-based 
services and thereby increase their profits. Moreover, the BRS 
market is embedded with the information about uncertainty and 
cost of capacity, based on which a market-based price for BRS 
is automatically decided. Next, we will explore the features of 
this market in detail. 
III. DEMAND AND SUPPLY CHARACTERISTICS OF BRS 
A. Demand 
As mentioned previously, though not universally applicable, 
it is assumed that VG producers are subject to imbalance 
penalties if they deviate from DA schedules. Otherwise, the VG 
producers bear no responsibility for their forecast errors and 
there is no need for subsequent discussions. Current market 
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practices vary with regards to the formation of deviation 
penalties. It might be a fixed dollar amount, or relate to the DA 
or RT clearing prices. Certainly, we are unable to explore all the 
possible penalty mechanism. But, proper assumptions can be 
made without loss of generality. 
In this paper, it is assumed that VG producers have to sell its 
over-generation at lower prices and settle its under-generation 
at higher prices than what occurs in the DA market. The pay-off 
function of a VG producer can be expressed as: 
   
   
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(1) 
The punitive RT settlement prices are represented by 
proportional relationships to the DA market clearing prices. In 
practice, if penalties are given and fixed at the DA stage the 
penalty factors 𝛼+ and 𝛼− can explicitly calculated. If they are 
uncertain until the realization of RT clearing prices, the factors 
can be estimated based on historic data and forecast 
information [12].  
If the producers are allowed to sign BRS contracts, the 
revenue will be as 
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(2) 
Therefore, the revenue becomes a function of purchased 
BRS 𝑟+ and 𝑟−. To determine the optimal amount of BRS, a 
VG producer aims at maximizing its expected revenue, which 
can be expressed as 
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(3) 
By taking the partial derivative of 𝑟+ and 𝑟−, we have: 
 
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 (5) 
Equation (4) and (5) describe the decreasing marginal utility 
of downward and upward BRS, i.e. the demand characteristics 
of BRS. According to the optimality condition, given the price 
level of downward and upward BRS, the optimal amount of 
BRS can be determined as: 
   1 10 0 0 0ˆ ˆˆ ˆ1 / /D v v Dr F p r p F                ，  (6) 
Taking downward BRS as an example, its demand 
characteristics is shown in Fig. 4. Given lower BRS prices, the 
producer will choose to purchase more. And the maximum 
amount of BRS it would like to buy is the headroom between 
DA schedule and the installed capacity. 
The whole area enclosed by the demand curve and axes, 
namely, (S1+S2+S3), represents the potential losses if no BRS is 
purchased. And, for another extreme case, if the price of BRS is 
0, then the producers will purchase (𝑝𝑣,𝑚𝑎𝑥 − ?̂?𝑣) downward 
BRS and can get rid of all the potential imbalance costs. For 
most of the situations, the producer will purchase BRS less than 
maximum amount and above zero. Therefore, the overall 
imbalance costs (OIC), which can be defined as the summation 
of imbalance penalties and payments for BRSs, can be 
represented by the area of (S2+S3), and the area of S1 is the 
consumer surplus of the BRS owner. This is interesting because 
the expected OIC of a VG producer is tied to the price of 
capacity. With higher BRS prices, the OIC, i.e. the area of 
(S2+S3), will increase. In contrast, if the system is sufficient in 
capacity and the price of BRS is low, the VG producer can 
hedge its exposure to deviation penalties at low cost. This is 
reasonable and compliant to the rule of cost causation. In other 
words, the pay-off of VG producers is not only decided by their 
intrinsic level of uncertainty, but also related to the adequacy of 
re-dispatch capacity. 
 
Fig. 4. Demand Characteristics of downward BRS of a VG producer. 
B. Supply 
The characteristics of BRS supply is much more complex 
because it is related to many factors. Basically, the cost of 
providing BRS is the potential risk of deviating from the 
optimal scheduling point in the DA market. Without loss of 
generality, let us take a normal unit as an example. If there is no 
BRS contract, the revenue of the unit can be expressed as 
 ˆ ˆg D g g R g RR p p p      
 (7) 
If the unit sells BRS to VG producers, and ∆𝑟  BRS is 
executed, the revenue of the unit will be changed to 
   * ˆ ˆg D g g R g RR p r p p r        
 (8) 
where, positive and negative ∆𝑟 means executed upward and 
downward BRS respectively. After the DA market has cleared, 
𝜆𝐷  and ?̂?𝑔 is given, while other quantities remain uncertain. 
Suppose that the owner of the unit is rational and bid its 
marginal cost to the market, then the execution of BRS will 
have no impact on the RT market clearing results. Therefore, 
the difference in pay-off is: 
 *g g D RR R r      (9) 
We assume that a single VG producer is a price taker and its 
deviation is independent from the difference between DA and 
RT market prices. Moreover, the expected ∆𝑟 and price gap are 
both close to zero. Therefore, the expectation of (9) is: 
     * 0g g D RR R r       (10) 
Hence, it seems that there is no extra cost of signing a BRS 
contract. However, equation (10) does represent an uncertain 
cash flow, which increases the risk of the BRS providers. More 
specifically, the increase in risk can be represented by the 
change in variance of cash flow: 
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(11) 
This quantity may be related to the type of units. For 
base-load units, the RT schedule is non-sensitive to RT prices 
since their marginal costs are usually below the clearing prices. 
Therefore, equation (12) can be approximately simplified as 
      *var var varg g D RR R r      (12) 
However, for those marginal units or quasi-marginal units, 
this is not the case. Denote 𝜗1 = (𝜆
𝐷 − 𝜆𝑅)Δ𝑟  and 𝜗2 =
[𝑝𝑔(𝜆𝑅) − ?̂?𝑔]𝜆𝑅 . 𝜗1  and 𝜗2  cannot be perfectly positively 
correlated. Combining (10) and (11), we have: 
     1 2 2 1var var var       (13) 
The left-hand side represents the incremental variance of 
marginal or quasi-marginal units, and the right-hand side 
corresponds to base-load units. Therefore, BRS contracts bring 
less incremental risk to marginal units than base-load units, 
which means that, with the same risk preferences, marginal 
units have advantages in providing BRS. Moreover, based-load 
units are more likely to be fully scheduled at DA market. 
Therefore, to offer upward BRS, they have to reduce its DA 
schedule to reserve enough capacity, which will incur extra 
opportunity costs. This is also possible for marginal units but is 
substantially less likely, meaning that marginal units face less 
opportunity costs to provide BRS. Additionally, it should be 
noted that if (10) does not hold, the expected difference can be 
estimated and added to the cost of offering BRS. 
It might not be straightforward to derive an explicit BRS 
supply curve of a unit. But it is clear that the cost of BRS 
corresponds to the compensation of risk. With higher risk, 
higher return will be required. And, providers that are more 
sensitive to market prices, such as marginal units, storage 
facilities and elastic demands, are all potential suppliers to the 
BRS market. 
IV. IMPACTS OF NETWORK CONSTRAINTS ON BRS 
 
Fig. 5. Executed BRS contract may potentially change system power flow. 
As shown in Fig. 5, a BRS contract enables the involved 
parties, i.e. a VG producer and a BRS provider, to switch DA 
scheduled output without being affected by market signals. If 
network congestion does exist, such privilege might hurt other 
participants in the system (cause infeasibility of DA power 
flow). In other words, market signals should be given to incent 
the VG producers to purchase re-dispatch capacity from 
“proper” locations. 
To achieve that, the most convenient way is to forbid BRS 
transactions between congested regions. However, sometimes 
congestion can happen inside regions. According to the 
available methods for transmission fee and power losses 
allocation [13]-[14], a potential alternative is to carry out an 
adjustment economic dispatch process after BRS transactions 
are closed, guaranteeing that all the signed BRS contracts are 
physically feasible. Then, the incremental costs incurred by 
BRS contracts are allocated to BRS contract holders without 
affecting the DA settlements of other market participants. Due 
to limit of space, the detail method of allocating BRS 
congestion costs will be discussed in our future work. 
V. NUMERICAL CASES 
 
Fig. 6. DA probabilistic forecast of a specific wind farm. 
C  
Fig. 7. DA energy clearing price. 
 
Fig. 8. Downward and upward BRS demand curve at hour 12 of the wind farm.  
To demonstrate the demand characteristics of BRS, we take a 
hypothetical wind farm located in Texas as an example. The 
historical forecast and actual output of the wind farm was 
obtained from [15], based on which we derive the probabilistic 
forecast (see Fig. 6). It is assumed that the wind power follows 
a Beta distribution, and the forecast error variance is 
conditional to the predicted mean value. Fig. 7 demonstrates the 
DA market clearing price of a certain day obtained from 
ERCOT’s website. For simplicity, suppose that 𝛼+ = 𝛼− = 𝛼. 
Then, Fig. 8 presents the demand curve of downward and 
upward BRS at hour 12 with different penalty factors. The 
results indicate that, with larger penalty factors, heavier 
balancing responsibility is put on VG producers, and the 
demand for BRS at the same price level increases. In Fig. 9, the 
demand characteristics of BRS during the whole day with 𝛼 set 
at 0.3 are demonstrated. A VG producer can seek to sign its 
optimal amount of BRS contracts according to the demand 
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characteristics. 
 
Fig. 9. BRS demand characteristics when penalty factors are set at 0.3. 
To examine the impacts of BRS prices on VG producers, we 
simply assume that the BRS price is proportional to the DA 
energy price, and then adjust the ratio. Fig. 10 demonstrate the 
expected profits of the wind farm with different level of BRS 
prices, assuming that the producer has maximized its expected 
revenue by purchasing the optimal amount of BRS. The profit 
is defined as the expected revenue with BRS minus the costs of 
purchasing BRS contracts. Meanwhile, we modify the level of 
VG forecast uncertainty by changing the estimated variance of 
the distribution, and calculate the expected profit under 
different levels of uncertainty. The results are also plotted in 
Fig. 10. By comparison, we can find that a higher level of 
uncertainty, or worse forecast quality, can always lead to lower 
expected income. When the re-dispatch capacity is scarce and 
its price is high, the VG producers will tend to run with less or 
without BRS contracts. This is why the profits under each 
uncertainty level approach to a certain level as the price of BRS 
increases. When the system is sufficient in capacity and the 
price of BRS is low, the difference in expected profit is much 
less remarkable. This is reasonable since sufficient capacity 
makes the cost of uncertainty relatively low. In this way, the 
proposed BRS-based mechanism is effective in addressing both 
the level of uncertainty of VG producers and the system 
resource sufficiency. 
  
Fig. 10. Expected profits of a wind farm with different levels of BRS contracts 
for different levels of DA forecast uncertainty (variance). For example, the 
black curve symbolled by square is calculated by increasing the variance of 
forecast error to 2.0 times of the original value. 
Due to the limited space, cases that demonstrate the entire 
market process of BRS and network congestion issues are not 
included.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this paper, we described a new product, BRS, and its 
market implementation to address the uncertainty of VG 
sources and the value of re-dispatch capacity. The basic idea is 
to allow the VG producers to purchase a certain amount of 
capacity after the DA scheduling process to avoid some of their 
deviation penalties. We analyzed the demand and supply 
characteristics of this product, and found that both sides have 
the incentives to participate in such transactions. Moreover, for 
VG producers, BRS can link their revenue to both their forecast 
quality and the availability of re-dispatch capacity resources. 
This is a desirable cost-causation feature that provides 
improves incentives to manage uncertainty in future power 
systems with large share of renewable energy. 
For future work, the market mechanism considering impacts 
of network congestion on BRS transactions should be properly 
designed. More case studies on market clearing of such 
capacity products need to be done. Moreover, it should be 
carefully examined whether this product will lead to 
unexpected market manipulation behaviors. 
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